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LYN'S greatest memorial stands in the insights he has
brought to our jurisprudence. Surely that memorial will stand as long
as our heritage endures.
I can do no more than recall some of the qualities that I saw in almost a
quarter of a century's work together, chiefly on the Uniform Commerical
Code-no small memorial by itself.
We who worked on the Code were a varied group of judges, lawyers, public
officials and professors. Karl was our Chief Reporter. It was an inadequate
title to describe one who could and did reveal to the judges the grand manner
of decision, to the lawyers the realism of the law, to the public officials what
they must do to better the law and to the professors the fallacies in their
favorite concepts.
Some of us knew what we were trying to accomplish, some knew why, and
others knew how. Karl always seemed to know all three and long before anyone else.
He was not yet thirty, with barely two years of practice and less than two
years of teaching experience, when he spoke out boldly about the law's need
to recognize and give effect to new business practices as they arise, to permit
to those practices a more-realistic flexibility and "to do both of these things
with an earnest view to the-economic function, and not to the legal incrustations, of the institution concerned... ." This was in 1923, more than 20 years
before the initial draft of the Commercial Code. If there has since been a
better statement of what the Code sought to accomplish, I have not seen it.
Karl Llewellyn truly loved commercial law, and he knew it with all of its
doctrines, practices, subtleties and refinements. But he had a first love which
commanded a first loyalty-jurisprudence. And it was the Llewellyn jurisprudence that commercial law needed. When he arrived on the scene, our Sales
Act and Negotiable Instruments Law were still modeled on English statutes
of a generation earlier. Commercial law was riddled with concepts which no
longer functioned and with technicalities which fought commercial practice.
Llewellyn had the philosopher's sweep, a realist's interest in fact and in the
meaning of people to law and of law to people, and an idealist's zeal for bettering the law.1 He could see the whole concept at work, see the facts behind
it and see where they didn't mesh.
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1Karl would have said a realist's interest is bettering the law, for the "ought" in law
was as much a part of his realist's faith as the "is." He took on Pound, Morris Cohen,
Jerome Frank, Kantorowicz and nearly every other jurisprude to prove it. I rather think

that Karl emerged from the tussle with his credo firmly planted in realistic jurisprudence.
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He was the first to speak out convincingly against that static concept in
commercial law known as Title, a concept which he devastatingly characterized as "rigid adherence to the notion of ownership as an indivisible rather
mystical something, which must be found in some one person." He showed
us how to travel--on horseback if you will-through title to contract and a
bit beyond. In doing so, he salvaged commercial law from the semi-chaos
toward which it was headed.
He dissected section 69 of the old Sales Act, showing that it had neither
sense, nor principle, nor good historical foundation. He reconstructed Warranty and again made it an effective tool for the men who operate it and upon
whom it operates. So throughout the work on the Commercial Code we relied
on Llewellyn not only .to show us where the existing tools failed to function,
but to fashion tools that would function.
The genius of Karl Llewellyn was not confined to the philosopher's role. He
was a superb craftsman and draftsman who could do as well as teach. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, of which
Karl was a member since 1926, included draftsmen of no mean talent of their
own. Yet drafting took on new dimensipns as Karl, who held the draftsman's
to be a noble art, fused craftsmanship with jurisprudence. As a craftsman he
taught us: "Drafting which fails to manipulate doctrine is bad drafting. Why
else -draft?" But as a philosopher he warned: "Drafting which too greatly
manipulates doctrine, is even technically bad drafting. Why else courts?"
But beyond the philosopher, beyond the draftsman, was the spirit of the
man. It was a spirit pure and infectious, which could make enthusiasts out of
cynics, win devotees to the grand tradition, convert the prosaic into the
esthetic, and impart grace to know-how and life to law.
Is it any wonder that those of us who worked by his side, more often sat at
his feet?

